http://www.govinfosecurity.com/topten2010/


A Defensive Cyber Security **Battle Plan**



John Streufert
Chief Information Security Officer
US Department of State
December 15, 2009

Will Address

A tactical risk Paradigm shifts to look at Lowering cost/raising ROI Solutions increasing readiness Deploying assets to win



Tactical Problem

- In combat whoever
 - "Observes Orients Decides
 - Acts" fastest wins.
- Cyber attacks are evolving faster than they can be counteracted outside DoD

¹ 'OODA' loops described in <u>Boyd</u>, <u>The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War</u>, by Robert Coram


ATTACKS

LICKETS

Years Compared FY 08 FY 09 2104 3085

FY 09 Quarters			
Quarters	Tickets		
Oct-Dec 08	560		
Jan-Mar 09	555		
Apr-Jun 09	639		
July-Aug 09 (Partial)	805		

Months Compared			
	2008 -	2009-	
	Tickets	Tickets	
June	154	300	
July	183	352	
August	250	250 453	



Targets:


[11 months before Feb 09]

CAG ID	Consensus Audit Guideline	NIST-800-53	US CERT Report
1	Inventory of authorized and unauthorized hardware	CM-1, CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-8, CM-9	+ 6 %
2	Inventory of authorized and unauthorized software	CM-1, CM-2, CM-3, CM-5, CM-7, CM-8, CM-9, SA-7	+ 22 %
5	Boundary Defense	AC-17, RA-5, SC-7, SI-4	+ 7%
9	Controlled access based on need to know	AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, AC-13	1 %
12	Anti-malware defenses	AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, AT-2, AT-3, CM-5, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5, MP-2, MP-4, PE-3, PE-4, PL-4, PS-6, RA-5, SA-7, SA-12, SA-13, SC-3, SC-7, SC-11, SC-20, SC-21, SC-22, SC-23, SC-25, SC-26, SC-27, SC-29, SC-30, SC-31, SI-3, SI-8	+ 60%

Penetration Tests

80% of the successful attacks used known vulnerabilities

Paradigm Shift(s)



Balance/tune essential elements now in operation

CXOs are accountable for IT security

BUT

directly supervise only a small part of the systems actually in use.

LAW and POLICY

Compliance "SNAPSHOTS"

- 1. "Annual" awareness course
- 2. "Annual" systems inventory
- 3. "Annual" testing
- 4. C&A every "three" years
- 5. Weaknesses "Quarterly"
- 6. Configuration Management
- 7. Incident Reporting

Certification and Accreditation studies

One Word

On December 17, 2002, the President signed into law the Electronic Government Act. Title III of that Act is FISMA, which lays out the framework for amual IT security reviews, reporting, and remediation planning at federal agencies. It requires that agency heads and IGs evaluate their agencies' computer security programs and report the results of those evaluations to OMB, Congress, and the GAO.

¹ House Oversight and Government Reform website

C&A PROCESS

Senes

C&A Concerns

- a. Once in 3 year study of 110 technical, managerial and operational controls (NIST 800-53)
 - 25-2000 pages; \$30K \$+2.5M
- b. Library cost: \$130M in 6 years
 - 95,000 pages @ \$1400 per page
- c. Changes: 150 -200 a week;
 - 24,000 programs changed in 3 years

Senes

C&A Concerns

- d. Technical control sections are out of date rapidly
- e. C&A's focus on individual systems. Enterprise faces risk.
- f. Many attacks focus on subset of controls (CAG)

Pilot

Continuous:

- 7. Incident Reporting
- 6. Configuration Management
- 5. "Daily" weakness updates
- 4. C&A technical controls x 72 x
- 3. Daily not "Annual" testing
- 2. **Inventory** improvements
- 1. "Daily" awareness training

Certification and Accreditation study of technical controls

Targeted Gains

C&A cost down 56% then 62% "

Invest in tool kits for everything

Contractor support just in time

Technical control data efficiency:

Every 2-15 days not 3 years

Assemble accountable tiger teams:

> inventory and to reduce site risks

Increasing Readiness


Information & Tools


Timely - Targeted² - Prioritized

"Metrics with the Most Meaning"

The One to One Fieldbook: The Complete Toolkit for Implementing a 1 to 1 Marketing Program by <u>Don Peppers</u>, <u>Martha Rogers</u>, and <u>Bob Dorf</u>

DoS Continuous Monitoring






Risk Score Advisor

The following grading scale is provided by Information Assurance and may be revised periodically.

Site Risk Score	8,687.1		
Hosts	317 27.4 A+		
Average Risk Score			
Risk Level Grade			
Rank in Enterprise	163 of 438		
Rank in Region	16 of 48		


	Average Risk Score			
Grade	Less Than	At Least		
A+	40.0	0.0		
Α	75.0	40.0		
В	110.0	75.0		
С	180.0	110.0		
D	280.0	180.0		
F	400.0	280.0		
F-	32	400.0		


Risk Score Profile




Component	Risk Score	Avg / Host	% of Score	How Component is Calculated
VUL - Vulnerability	947.0	3.0	10.9 %	From .1 for the lowest risk vulnerability to 10 for the highest risk vulnerability
PAT - Patch	603.0	1.9	6.9 %	From 3 for each missing "Low" patch to 10 for each missing "Critical" patch
SCM - Security Compliance	6,181.2	19.5	15/7/1/5/7/1/07/1/07	From .9 for each failed Application Log check to .43 for each failed Group Membership check
AVR - Anti-Virus	0.0	0.0	0.0 %	6 per day for each signature file older than 6 days
SOE - SOE Compliance	115.0	0.4	1.3 %	5 for each missing or incorrect version of an SOE component
ADC - AD Computers	26.0	0.1	0.3 %	1 per day for each day the AD computer password age exceeds 35 days
ADU - AD Users	222.0	0.7		1 per day for each account that does not require a smart-card and whose password age > 60, plus 5 additional if the password never expires
SMS - SMS Reporting	230.0	0.7	2.6 %	100 + 10 per day for each host not reporting completely to SMS
VUR - Vulnerability Reporting	84.0	0.3	1.0 %	After a host has no scans for 15 consecutive days, 5 + 1 per 7 additional days
SCR - Security Compliance Reporting	279.0	0.9	3.2 %	After a host has no scans for 30 consecutive days, 5 + 1 per 15 additional days
Total Risk Score	8,687.1	27.4	100.0 %	

For additional information on Risk Scoring, assistance with remediations, or to report suspected false positives, contact the IT Service Center to open a "Risk Score" ticket.










Risk Score Monitor Enterprise

Total Hosts	32,366	51,157
Average Risk Score per Host	101.7	33.2

Grading Scale


Average Risk Score At Least Less Than Grade 0.0 40.0 A+ A 40.0 75.0 75.0 110.0 В 110.0 180.0 C D 180.0 280.0 280.0 400.0 400.0 F-

Grade Dis







Results in 12 Months



Risk Score Monitor Enterprise





Deploying

Assets

To Win

Finding

Details empower technical managers

FOR TARGETED, DAILY
ATTENTION TO REMEDIATION


Summaries empower executives

TO OVERSEE CORRECTION OF MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Lessons Learned

- When continuous monitoring augments snapshots required by FISMA:
 - Mobilizing to lower risk is feasible & fast (11 mo)
 - Changes in 24 time zones with no direct contact
 - Cost: 15 FTE above technical management base
- This approach leverages the wider workforce
- Security culture gains are grounded in fairness, commitment and personal accountability for improvement

Implementation



Cylinder # 1: Change

- Business/Organization critical success factors:
 - Business Change Management
 - Communications
 - Culture of Cost Effectiveness
 - Negotiation
 - Security Risk/Threat Analysis
 - Performance Measurement
 - Data Analysis

Cylinder #2: Technical

- Critical Success Factors (Technical):
 - Data Enclave Protection
 - ID & Authentication
 - Data Mining Tools: Interface Design and Construction
 - Database design/administration/hardening
 - Information Broker management
 - System Administration

Cylinder #3: Adequacy of Plan

Coverage of CAG

View

Cylinder #4: Logistics

Tools to Deploy:


- CAG Directed Toolset baseline growing to 15 control families. Status now:
 - a. SMS (Systems Management Server Microsoft)
 - b. Vulnerability/Configuration Management
 - N-Circle, Tenable, McAfee
- 2. Data warehouse to store enterprise risk information securely (GOTS)
- 3. Risk Scoring Dashboard (GOTS)

Cylinder #5: Acquisition

Model:


- Multiple award contract from GSA
 - Dashboard, 15 tool groups, data integration
 - Continuous update of scanner technology
- OMB, DHS, NIST guidance to protect .gov
 - Yardsticks needed for each of 20 CAG elements
 - Public-private FDCC model achieved the most, the fastest;
- Federal level interdisciplinary support team

Cylinder #6: Architecture



Cylinder #7: Integration

Answer: Adjust priorities for hardening in response to actual/possible threats



Cylinder #8 Training



Federal conclusions

- Scalable to large complex public and private sector organizations
- Higher ROI for continuous monitoring of technical controls as a substitute for paper reports
- Summarized risk estimates could be fed to Cyber Scope in lieu of outdated compliance results